Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.

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Christine Tappolet is the Canada Research Chair in Ethics and Meta-ethics and an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Université de Montréal. She is the author of Émotions et Valeurs (2000) and the co-author, with Ruwen Ogien, of Les Concepts de l’éthique (2008) and of several articles in meta-ethics, moral psychology and the philosophy of emotions.

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'Review from previous edition ...a valuable resource for anyone interested in the nature of rational action.' Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

'... an attractive volume ... [which] represents an important contribution to action theory, philosophy of mind and moral psychology, and should be read by anyone who works in these areas.' Journal of Moral Philosophy